

DUTY GOVERNING HUMAN ACTIONS: TO ACT BECAUSE IT IS RIGHTEOUS

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ABSTRACT

We argue that humans have at least three basic instincts, the instinct of selfishness, of belongingness and of duty. We explore the instinct of duty through describing its origin in Kantian moral thinking and through extracting some implications of duty through analysing three persons and their actions. We believe that we make duty a reasonable category of human action, if not an instinct of humans, using evolutionary arguments in order to support our thesis. We indicate opportunities of empirically studying duty through offering testable hypotheses and suggestions of empirical design. Thus, we claim that management science can include Kant and action due to duty in the arsenal of explanations of human behaviour.

(119 words)

Key words: Duty, behaviour

INTRODUCTION

'So Hans,' said the chairman 'what do you think about the proposal to move the production plant to China?' The response from Hans was immediate and surprising for everyone at the board table. Hans said, with strong engagement and forced voice: 'I totally oppose it. The firm can survive although the production costs will be somewhat higher. To invest in a totalitarian country, lacking any other freedom than to exploit their cheap labour, including absence of free speech, absence of democracy, but presence of killing protesting students, just in order to gain some small percent of profit, is outrageous, it is not right and therefore against my will.' The chairman was surprised, but realized that the decision could wait until the next board meeting. Hans were among the most important and influential directors, making it hard to force the decision.

After the board meeting, the chairman talked to Hans, trying to change Hans' mind. He said: 'It is very important for our decision that we are in total agreement. I beg you to look more on the firm's future development than on your political standpoints. And you know that you have been suggested to step up to become vice chairman next year, with the accompanied bonus benefits, which will be hard if you oppose this strategic investment.' Hans did not hesitate but gave a quick reply: 'It is not about politics, it is about doing what is right. I realize that if the firm proceeds with this investment plan, I have to leave the board. That is natural and fair. And I have no trouble with it. You see, when I come down from my bedroom to the first floor in the morning, I see myself in the mirror that hangs right in front of the staircase. I know that I would have to turn my face away every morning if I accepted to invest in China. And I enjoy my face.'

At the following annual shareholder meeting, Hans retired from the board, with the motivation that he had to focus on other issues for some years to come and that he therefore believed that he couldn't perform satisfactory as a director of the corporation. The chairman hailed Hans and his past contribution and regretted that Hans had to turn to other issues. At the first board meeting after the shareholder meeting, the board decided in unity to move the production plant to China.

In this story we find the chairman trying to stimulate Hans to conform to the ideas of the rest of the group of directors through appealing to a common sense for the firm and its development. But without success. The chairman then tried to exploit Hans' self-interest, stimulating him to decide in favour of moving the plant with reference to an increase in Hans' status through becoming vice chairman and an increase in his wealth through the bonus scheme. But in vain. Hans did not react on the call of the group or the call on his wealth and

status, since his judgment was directed by a strong personal opinion which Hans's could not compromise with. Apparently Hans had a principle that guided his action.

These kinds of situations are happening. Though not having any frequency of occurrence to report, we believe that Hans's behaviour is not uncommon in reality. In research, this kind of behaviour is, however, uncommon, if not absent. In research on rational human behaviour, there is a domination of two patterns, one dominated by economist, claiming that the individual will try to maximize the utility, balancing the costs and benefits, choosing the action that is the most beneficial. This represents the instinct of selfishness. On the other hand, researchers of groups would claim that Hans would make the choice of the action that made him most conform to the norms and interest of the group, i.e., the team at the board of directors. This is the instinct of belongingness.

We suggest that a theory of rational behaviour have to consider the third alternative, that the individual have a *Weltanschauung* that directs the person's actions. That is the instinct of duty, that a person has to do what a person has to do, no matter the costs and benefits. The behaviour is rational according to Kantian moral philosophy, since it is based on the rational practical reason. It is rational because the actions are evaluated according to conformance towards the maxims of the *Weltanschauung*, but there is no evaluation of costs and benefits, making it impossible to make an order of possible actions. Either they are acceptable or they are not acceptable, and there is nothing in between.

The hardship of dealing with duty in theory is that at the present conceptual development actions of duty appears as sudden outbursts, as in the example, which are hard to predict. It is like heating milk, nothing is happening, and suddenly the whole stove is filled with over-heated milk. There is no quantitative increase, but a sudden leap, a qualitative step, where the action appears to be suddenly executed. This is, we believe, due to the undeveloped character of duty as an instinct of humans.

We claim that a human being is governed by the instinct of self-interest, the instinct of belongingness, and the instinct of duty. They are termed instincts because they are not subject to individual choice, but belong to the faculties of humans. They govern our actions, but the mix of them, the factors influencing the emphasis of each of them, what determines the composition of them, are by the knowledge of us not explored in science yet.

The contention and thesis of the paper is that there exist actions performed out of duty. The aim of the paper is to contribute to the understanding of human action through exploring duty as a motivation to human action.

The paper will start by reviewing the few contributions to the instinct of duty. Then duty will be explored through discussing Kant's concept of duty, and its conceptual relevance as a third class of driver for human action will be indicated. We then turn to efforts of explaining the existence of duty and to explore cases of actions performed out of duty. Finally, we will indicate how empirical studies of duty can be performed, and we discuss some implications of duty. The paper ends with a summary of all explorative parts in order to arrive at a more informed conceptualisation of duty as a third instinct of humans.

DUTY COMPARED WITH SELFISHNESS AND BELONGINGNESS

Economic agents of today are claimed to be motivated by two different forces, the instinct of selfishness and the instinct of belongingness, represented by two different perspectives on humans, the economic man and the social man. We would like to add the moral man that acts out of duty.

Agency theory has as its starting point the claim that every individual is governed by self-interest. This is, as argued by Granovetter (1985), an under-socialised view of human action and human motives to action, creating the image of man as "...close to being a social moron." (Sen, 1977:336). On the other hand, sociological studies tend to stress internalization and group behaviour, i.e., belongingness or affinity to such an extent that they reach a view of action and motives that is over-socialised.

We extend the classes of human actions from two to three classes. A human being, we claim, is governed by the instinct of self-interest, the instinct of belongingness, and the instinct of duty. They are termed instincts because they are not subject to individual choice, but belong to the faculties of humans. Each instinct have been explored; the instinct of self-interest in economics, the instinct of belongingness in sociology and psychology, but the instinct of duty only in parts and bits in sociology and practical philosophy, and to a lesser degree in economics through the growing interest in business ethics (e.g. Victor & Cullen, 1988).

The exploration of duty is still in commence in economics and business administration. The omission of one significant human motivation to action can maybe be explained by the image of Uomo d'onore that has been created by the endless stream of entertainment movies of the Sicilian and Italian mafia, or the image of the Prussian Junker, that led by duty went to war. It can, however, be found in political studies, such as public policy formation (Kriesi and Jegen, 2000), based on the Weber notion of the different types of action: instrumentally rational, value rational, affectual and traditional. In this categorization, studies in

business administration have been focused on instrumental rationality, as in agency theory, or traditional action, as in institutional theory, where imitation and isomorphism are important concepts. The value rational (wertrational) action, which can be expressed as duty, has overall been neglected.

In fact, one prophet of economic sociology has written: “It would appear that value-rational action cannot be economic by definition— who, for example, has ever heard of economic martyrs?—and that results in the narrow sense thereby would be ruled out from the type of actions investigated by the economic sociologist. I am, however, not so sure that this is the case, because economic sociology sometimes deals with religious and political behavior, which can be value-rational.” (Swedberg, 2007:1047)

One study approaching duty were offered as early as 1975, explaining professional organizations as implementers of value-rational action (Satow, 1975). It did not, however, get any followers and went into oblivion.

In Sweden, one study (Guillet de Monthoux, 1981) appeared, dealing with normative action. The conception of duty created, however, a tension between action and normative action. A less conflictual model of normative behaviour has been presented by Etzioni (1988). It has continued into the research areas of business ethics (Victor & Cullen, 1988) and corporate social performance (Swanson, 1995), leaving the case of duty unexplored. In the field of corporate governance it has, however, been expressed in a descriptive way by the stewardship view (Davis, Schoorman & Donaldson, 1997), stressing the duty of fiduciary responsibility. Recently, White (2004) presented a Kantian conception of duty, pushing duty into the model of preferences and utilities, but at the price of not being able to offer an answer to the question, why being moral (Campbell and Christopher, 1996), i.e., giving up the necessary assumption of the autonomous human that have the freedom of making the choice of acting out of duty. Recently, Beugré (2010) argued conceptually that deontic agents, i.e., individuals acting out of duty, could resist socialization into norms of corruption in organizations.

There are several reasons why an agent of duty can be conceivable in economic environments. One reason is using the Perrow (1986) notion of human flexibility, asking the question; under what conditions will an individual behave according to the instinct of self-interest, belongingness and duty? Experiments have showed that individuals tend to act more in accordance to fairness than self-interest when the other players are identified as persons (Camerer and Thaler, 1995), i.e., the instinct of belongingness can be triggered by identity of the exchange partner. Thus, situation and environment stimulates certain behaviour. Empirical

studies of ethical climates (Victor & Cullen, 1988; Cullen, Parboteeah & Victor, 2003) appear to support this argument. Another reason is that it is conceivable that certain environments, for example those experiencing high uncertainty, select individuals that act according to duty (White, 2004). Thus, behaviour guided by duty could be selected by the environment.

Our claim is that there are, at least, three models of the human being in the economic sphere, based on three instincts, with capacity to predict human behaviour. We are going to add duty, and therefore we will now show that there is a conceptual space available for duty.

Self-interest is when an individual act upon a calculus where the costs and benefits for the individual are summed together through a preference function into a utility which produce the action. There are no limitations of the behaviour, thus even opportunistic acts and illegal acts are included since it is only the calculus that put the limits on the behaviour. Self-interest is the rationality behind an action that economics has made hegemonic, deeming all actions to be explained through the calculus of individual utility. Incentive systems are those organizational instruments that are used to manipulate the instinct and create desirable actions. This is the behaviour of the agent appearing in agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).

The need of belongingness is the attitude treated by sociologists (Baumeister and Leary, 1995; Cremer and Leonardelli, 2003; Gere and MacDonald, 2010), claiming that humans have a tendency to belong to groups, and to adjust to the norms of the group (Blair & Stout, 2001). In order to be accepted in the group, an individual internalize norms, i.e., becomes socialized, or act in a way that is considered to be legitimate, for example reciprocity and inequity aversion (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2002). This instinct can have rather simple modern manifestations, such as supporters of a football team, or more advanced and totalitarian systems, with the function of creating a coherent society, such as religion (Graham and Haidt, 2010). The sanction system of the group is governing this instinct, where the ultimate sanction is the exclusion from the group.

The need to do the right thing signifies the tendency of humans to experience a duty (Blair & Stout, 2001), which is an action that is being performed because the individual consider the action to be obligatory. It is a normative behaviour in the sense that it rest on an order that the individual carry, but it is not defined by a group, but by the individual. Thus, it has to be clearly separated from the instinct of belongingness, where the group through their ideology defines the proper behaviour. Duty is not something that is performed, as in the

instinct of belongingness, in order to please the group and to be accepted by the group. An action governed by duty is performed because it is right and because it has to be performed.

The motivation to perform actions according to the different instincts differs. The self-interest motivation is with reference to the individual, the motivation of belongingness has a reference to the group, and the duty has a reference to the righteous order and its rules. As claimed by Kantian moral philosophy, which we will present in the next section, a duty is not performed out of inclination, be it towards the self or others. It is without desire, except the desire to perform the duty.

The instinct of belongingness and the instinct of duty are both behaviour governed by internalized norms. A major difference between these two instincts is that the sense of belongingness is tied to a group and the feelings for the group, while the sense of duty, according to Kant, is tied to practical Reason. We transpose it into *Weltanschauung*, which is a system of ideas that define the proper actions the actor has to perform, i.e., to paraphrase the honourable men of the Wild West: ‘an actor has to do, what an actor has to do’.

Duty is an instinct that governs human rational action through relating action alternatives to a *Weltanschauung* that indicate what actions have to be performed, without reference to individual or social utility, but to what is righteous. It cannot be reduced to corporate social responsibility (CSR) or other similar approaches since they are teleological models, thus not being in accordance to duty, since duty is a deontological model.

It should be stressed that although being claimed to be instincts, they vary between individuals, depending on the individual history. It has been found, for example, that Kibbutz children, trained in a highly cooperative culture, are more prone to cooperate than children from middle-class city environments in Israel (Shapira, 1976; Shapira and Madsen, 1969), and that children from Israeli Kibbutz and Germany are more cooperative and less competitive in behaviour than Israeli and American city children (Madsen and Shapira, 1977). It has also been found that moral judgement differs between cultures, as defined by ethnicity, nationality and class (Haidt, Koller and Dias, 1993). Thus, it can be claimed that environment, such as culture, do not remove any instinct, but influence its application.

In order to develop our view of duty, we now turn to a description of duty, using our interpretation of the Kantian moral idea.

KANTIAN DUTY

The human being is heteronomous in the sense that she is influenced by her desire to happiness, to life and to be accepted in a group. These are the driving forces of selfishness and

belongingness. The individual being makes decisions and acts out of a calculus how to improve her individual utility or social acceptance. She thereby becomes a function of her calculus and the situation for her as biological being or social being. She is dependent of something outside her i.e., she is heteronomous,.

The human being is, however, also autonomous, and it is her autonomy that is the subject of the Kantian moral teaching (Kant, 2004). She has the possibility to act out of freedom, independent of any outside force that stimulate her to perform an action. Freedom can, however, not be proved, but only indicated as a necessary assumption in order to explain the existence of the moral order. In this sense Freedom is for the practical Reason what *Das Ding an Sich* is for the pure Reason, a necessary assumption, but which we can have no knowledge about, and therefore never can prove. It is, however, a necessary assumption in order to understand morality. The human being has the possibility to formulate categorical imperatives, which are rules for the will, thus she is free since only those that are free can formulate rules for themselves. Freedom is the capacity to regulate yourself, independent of situation and circumstances.

The human regulation of her will is the moral law, which is contained in the practical Reason, as compared to the pure Reason, where the principles of knowledge reside. As an individual she creates maxims, i.e., rules of her conduct, for example, 'I will take care of anyone that needs me'. Confronted with a human that needs care, she has the free choice of taking care of the person, or to walk by. The assaulted person in the Gospel according to St. Luke (10:29-37) could be left behind, as the priest did since the person were not a Jew, or could be taking care of, as the Samaritan did, since the suffering person was a human being. The morally correct action is not to adhere to maxims, but to confront your maxims with the categorical imperative, the ultimate regulation of the free will. It says, in two famous formulations that: 1. "Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law." ("Handle nur nach derjenigen Maxime, durch die du zugleich wollen kannst, dass sie ein allgemeines Gesetz werde"), and 2. "Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never merely as a means to an end, but always at the same time as an end" ("Handle so, dass du die Menschheit sowohl in deiner Person, als in der Person eines jeden anderen jederzeit zugleich als Zweck, niemals bloß als Mittel brauchst.")). Since the assaulted person is a human being, she has to be treated as an end, i.e., taking care of, thus, according to the first formulation, the maxim of taking care of others is morally correct since it can be a universal law.

The correct moral actions are those actions that are in accordance to maxims that can be made universal laws. The Kantian moral system is therefore a deontological moral system, where the morality comes from acting according to certain maxims. This can be compared to moral systems, like the utilitarian, that is a teleological moral system since it judges a moral action out of its consequences. The morally correct action is not when you apply a calculus and find out that the action can produce something considered as good. If you do that, you are not free, but ruled by the consequences of your actions. Instead, you have to adhere to the maxim and act in accordance to it. If the rule stands the test of the categorical imperative, you have made a morally correct action.

Duty (Pflicht in German) is the action performed out of reverence of the maxim that is in accordance to the categorical imperative. It is not obeying the maxim, it is not to act because it is in accordance to a duty where the duty tells you how to act, since then the duty is the cause of the action, and thereby it is not a free act. Duty in the moral sense is not to perform due to duty, but out of duty. It is paying respect to a maxim, to act, not in accordance to a duty, but because it is a duty. Therefore, duty can be pleasant or unpleasant, but both of these are personal feelings and sentiments arrived at during the act, which are consequences, and therefore without any moral value. Duty is performed since it is right, which is the only reason, the only cause of the act. Through duty the human being manifest herself as a being with practical reason, vanquish her biology and her social needs, realizing her freedom and manifest her as an intelligible being.

This sense of being noble, when only listening to her own Reason, is termed self worth or self-respect. It should, of course, not be interpreted as an argument of subjectivity and individualism, since Reason is a faculty of all intelligible beings. It is truly universal, not being tied to any individual sentiments and occasional feelings, or to any democratic feelings, trying to satisfy a group or a majority of humans, since moral standards are not subject for voting but for the categorical imperative. Duty is universal, although self-respect is individual.

We transpose this idea of one single universal Reason into a system of ideas held in esteem by an individual, which we term Weltanschauung. It could be translated into World view, but we are not sure that the English term connotes the very content of Weltanschauung, being a set-up of ideas and beliefs that make it possible for the individual to understand the world and to interact with the world, i.e., the concept is both a concept of cognition and of action. While world view is probably only a system of ideas, which excludes it from being a concept of moral, Weltanschauung includes praxis, thus stressing action, and thereby being a concept of morality. We also realize that transposing practical Reason to Weltanschauung is

controversial, but space is limited and arguments would divert attention from the exploration of duty. We are confined with the comment that universal Reason runs the risk of being reduced to the liberal contractual conception of the original position, as presented by Rawls (1989), which present society as devoid one of its very basic elements, that of conflict.

Summarizing it can be said that duty is to perform an act that follows a maxim that has been evaluated by the individual using the categorical imperative with reference to a Weltanschauung. Duty manifests the individual as a free, autonomous and intelligible being (i.e., carrier of practical Reason) with self-respect. In order to continue our exploration of duty, we now turn to an evolutionary, but highly speculative explanation to the existence of duty as an instinct.

EXPLAINING DUTY

A famous explanation to duty is made by Norbert Elias (1991), in his book '*Über den Prozeß der Zivilisation - Soziogenetische und psychogenetische Untersuchungen*' where he claims that duty, or capacity of self-discipline, have grown in interaction with the productive forces. Human society has expanded its functional separation, which has lead to enormous productivity gains and increasing dependency, especially in the upper classes. In the aftermath of the breakdown of the Roman empire, and the disorganized violent times of the era of the Migration period (der Völkerwanderung) and the Viking invasions, a stronger state developed, with stronger tax capacity, and most important, with capacity to monopolize violence, which Elias claim is one of the keys to economic and social development. With monopoly of violence, individuals felt stronger security and could develop skills, make investments at less risk and be engaged in more fruitful trade and production. Since the relationships and interactions increased in number and intensity, dependency increased and humans developed capacity to control themselves in order to govern the many relationships. Not being able to deal with relationships through violence, humans turned to social sanctions and internalized norms. Or stated differently, when the anxiety in a violent society is reduced due to the states control of violence, the human reason can develop its capacities and expand its influence on human behaviour. Thus, duty as a regulative mechanism, based on reason, could develop as a control mechanism of human relationships when violence disappeared as an opportunity and as a threat, increasing the possibility of exchange and therefore of specialization, which has produced the productivity gains that we now enjoy.

Reason grows in power when fear is reduced and the human capacity does not have to spend resources and energy on fear and its mechanisms. Therefore we would expect to find more duty in societies of less unpredictable violence and instability.

This explanation is, however, a pure social functional explanation of the development of duty. It assumes the presence of the instinct of duty, but do not explain its origin. We have to turn to more evolutionary attempts of explanation.

Egoism is a fundamental drive of humans. The survival of the fittest is its evolutionary formula. But another important drive that can even overrule egoism is nepotism, the care directed at genetically close individuals. It has been termed inclusive fitness (Hamilton, 1964a, b), and predicts that the closer an individual is genetically to another human, the more help it will get. A father and a mother are willing to even sacrifice his or her life if the life of the offspring is in danger. This is even more emphasised for females since they are more nepotistic since females are more certain of the genetically set-up of the offspring than the males.

This explanation is dependent on the gestalt of hunting societies, which we have lived in for more than 100000 years, which preceded the farming society, which we have lived in for only 10000 years, thus hunting society have been more genetically influential on human genes. The knowledge is fragile since it cannot be based on direct observations, but on the science of archaeology, inspecting remains of humans, and the anthropological comparison with hunting societies of today.

Nepotism could, however, be expanded to include even non-genetically similar individuals. With the faculty of helping another person, at expense of its own utility, humans could create lasting relationships in a small group. Through the group, every individual belonging to the group increased its survival possibility. Males, with the tendency to monopolize mating gave up the monopoly in order to secure the presence of more males, with capacity to defend the group. A genetically small prize to pay for increased survival. This expanded nepotism has been termed reciprocal altruism (Trivers, 1971), since it is support of non-genetic individuals, but with the long-term expectation of reciprocity.

But humans have even stronger capacity to altruism. If humans have been egoists, the survivors from Titanic would have been strong men. If humans would have been only nepotistic, the survivors would have been families. But Frey, Savage and Torgler (2010) has found that females, and especially females in fertile age and women with children had the highest survival rate. This can be explained by females being more nepotistic, but overall, that the individuals gave way to women and children in the life boats. In a group of individuals, the

single female is more important than the male since one male can cause many children, but a female can only cause one child each year. Thus, individual males are more expensible than individual females. But this goes for a small group characterized by belongingness. The humans on Titanic did not belong to a small group, but were individuals gather together without any sense of belongingness. Thus, men could fight the way to the life boats without endanger the survival if his group. But overall, they did not, which can be an indication of the presence of a genetically determined behaviour of reciprocal altruism, where the norm of survival of women and children are expressed.

There were, however, also indications of cultural influence. The survival rate of north-Americans was higher than that of Scandinavians and Englishmen, thus indicating that the norm of 'women and children first' differ between cultures.

The dominating survival rate of different gender and ages was, however, in accordance to altruism with no apparent short-term or even long-term advantage for the genes of those that gave their lives. This is the Samarian altruism, which we have discussed earlier as the characteristics of duty. Thus, the disaster of Titanic offer us dramatic possibility to find indications of Samarian altruism, and therefore of duty. But we still have to explain the presence of duty.

We can think of at least three explanations of duty: Mechanic altruism, selection of leaders and a side effect of social capacity.

Mechanic altruism is that humans have the nepotistic tendency, that is converted into altruism that always is present and available for influencing action, without any regard to the benefits of the group. Thus, humans have gained the capacity to act in accordance to rules that the individual believe is or should be universal. This is probably not a good explanation since the argument of altruism is the survival of the group, thus putting very strong limitations on who should receive the effects of reciprocal altruism.

Selection of leaders claims that duty is more characterized by the leaders of the group than of the other individuals in the group. The individuals of a group can more easily accept to be subjected to the power of another individual, i.e., to award someone authority, if the subordinate believes that the powerful individual is acting in pure interest of the group. The more carried by duty, the more easily the behaviour can be predicted and trusted, and with universal duties supporting the group and not the individual, the more the individual will be preferred as a leader of the group. Thus, duty survives as an instinct in human societies since it is a faculty of the hierarchical group.

The third possible explanation says that humans have, over all, a social capacity, as indicated by the Titanic disaster where Samaritan altruism varied according to culture. The freedom of humans to create norms, with the capacity to increase the solidarity in a group, has been evolutionary selected compared to humans with less social capacity, and therefore with weaker capacity to organize surviving groups of humans. She has a freedom to invent new norms and to develop old norms, in order to adapt to the environment. She is free and creative, and can transcend what appear to be genetically limitations, such as egoism, nepotism and reciprocal altruism, in order to be able to invent new technologies, be technical or institutional, that can create higher survival rate of the genes, but not necessarily of the individual. The freedom of humans, as Kant assumed but could not prove, is maybe selected by nature as a characteristic of human species giving them higher survival rate than those governed by mere instincts. The extreme manifestation of this selected freedom is the capacity to perform due to duty. Thus, duty is not what cause survival, but is an effect of the characteristic that cause survival, the freedom of the human. Her freedom to create norms, i.e., the very capacity of social construction (which is no social construction, but the capacity to be socially constructive) to create norms, with the side effect to be able to create norms not only for social groups, but norms per se.

If this has any truth, we have arrived at an explanation saying that humans have gained freedom that create survival through making her adaptive, with two different representations, the instinct of belongingness and the instinct of duty.

In order to continue our exploration of duty, we present three empirical cases of actions performed under duty. These are the actions of Alceste, Jane Eyre and Adolf Eichmann.

THREE CASES OF DUTY

The Misanthrope Alceste

Moliere (1988) wrote and published the play '*Le Misanthrope ou l'Atrabilaire amoureux*', i.e., the Misanthrope, the year 1666. It is a play about the truth-loving Alceste and the intermezzos that his principle of truth creates, for him, for his love ones and for his environment. At that time, as indeed in our time, the drawing-rooms were impregnated by flattery and fawning, combined with slander and whispering voices. Smooth and easy manners, it could be termed. Alceste is, however, deeply in love with Célimène, which has a very flexible manner towards the people of the drawing rooms. That smoothness is shared by Alceste best friend, Philinte, that claims: "But when we are of the world, we must conform to the outward civilities which custom demands". Alceste oppose such ingratiating behaviour since he has to tell the truth. It is

not a choice of his own, but an absolute duty he has to fulfil: “I like a man to be a man, and to show on all occasions the bottom of his heart in his discourse.” And he is prepared to take it to its end, so he makes the statement that creates the title of the play: “I become quite melancholy and deeply grieved to see men behave to each other as they do. Everywhere I find nothing but base flattery, injustice, self-interest, deceit, roguery. I cannot bear it any longer; I am furious; and my intention is to break with all mankind.” Above and beyond all pleasures and all rewards that is given to the socially easy man, is his fight for truth, which makes Moliere describe his passion as a fight against humanity.

The play was launched as a comedy, and the main comic events in the play is created by the contrast between Alceste’s socially uneasy passion for truth and the other persons smiles and laughs and pleasant manners. Philinte, the loyal friend of Alceste, make this observation:”... that all those invectives against the manners of the age, make you a laughing stock to many people.”

The truth claimed by Alceste throws him into a process, which he loses. At the same time Célimène declares her love to Alceste, which he surprisingly turns down. The comedy ends abruptly, probably with Alceste escaping from both the process and the love affair.

Maybe Moliere is here giving us some hope. Passion for truth creates problems, but that is but a semblance since Alceste, when he gets the love he wanted so much, runs off. Only Alceste can carry the real truth, he believes. When someone else openly and without calculation and easy social manners declares something of truth, his monopoly of being the principle of truth is broken. Then his distinctive character in the play is gone, his identity is eroding and by that, he disappears. At the end, it appears that the socially smooth Célimène can represent truth by her love, but Alceste appear to use his principle of truth, the duty, only as a social marker. Thus, at the end, it appears that Alceste is like the other ones, only with a different marker. That is why the play ends with a hope by Philinte: “Come, Madam, let us leave nothing untried to deter him from the design on which his heart is set.”

The passion of the truth appears throughout the play, except at the very end, to be without any consideration of the consequences. For that reason we can term Alceste a man of duty in the drawing-room society of calculus and consequences. While the others assume and follow, at least on the surface and in the outspoken, the time and its conventions, Alceste follow his obligation, the duty to speak the truth. Certainly everyone realize the truth, since without the truth there would be no slander and no backbiting, but everyone also realize that a lie could be a good instrument in order to accomplish social unity. They use egoism, for their own profit and altruism for the benefit of social harmony. For them, duty is maybe

uncomfortable, but above all, it is devastating. The duty to tell the truth does not carry anything good with it, and therefore it is not desirable.

If we leave the internal drama and see the play as a comedy, driven by Alceste's duty to tell the truth, we realize that duty can easily be ridiculed. It is not really the duty to tell the truth that is ridiculous. It is the act of the duty that carries the laughs. It is the rigid action, to never consider the consequences, to never adapt to the situation, to calculate the costs and benefits of an action. The comedy arrives because Alceste always acts, never reacts. It is his passion for the truth, the very duty that creates the acts by him. Never an act created by calculus and consideration. It is de-ontologically rational, but verily not consequence rational.

We can also note that Alceste has a loyal assistant, Philinte, that takes care of him and helps him because due to his duty he cannot cope with the world, and the world cannot cope with him. Philinte is standing by his side as a social calculator and informant about social customs, giving him advice based on consequences of actions. He is the one considering reactions, not actions.

The Kantian *a priori* we here gets as misanthropic aloof in the world. The act without any consideration of the situation, and without any eye on the consequences for anyone, including the actor. The *a priori* appears to be out of touch with reality. A person led by duty in the world of drama appears so much *a priori* that he needs a *posteriori*, without any egoism, to be the calculator. Both these functions, to be a *posteriori* and to be calculator that through his experience can find out reactions that can profit the individual, is the part played by Philinte. These two functions, performed in the shadow of a man of duty, we recognize in the play of Don Quixote (Cervantes, 2001), where Sancho Panza makes it possible for Don Quixote to survive through all his missions of chivalry. Another striking similarity between the play and the novel is that the authors let the two men of duty convert to more sane conditions at the end, but at the price, for Alceste to flee and for Don Quixote to die of melancholy. Cervantes and Moliere are here only telling us what we always have to remember, that humans are concrete individuals, and when we stress only one aspect of humans we get good laughs in comedies, tears in dramas, and theoretical explanations in science. Those that claim that they offer a theory in accordance to "...human nature as we know it..." (Knight, 1965; Williamson, 1996), are making the same comedian mistake as Don Quixote did, mixing what's in the imaginative books with concrete reality.

Jane Eyre

Jane Eyre was an orphan that stayed her youth on a boarding school characterized by rough and hard discipline, which she objected to. Already as a small child she revolted against the lady that took care of her and gave her shelter. Something the lady considered to be a home, which Jane objected against.

At one occasion in the novel she is being asked to leave the room after a dramatic scene. Jane refuses and says: "*Speak* I must:..." (Brontë 1994:38, Italics by the author). She then tells her mistress that she dislikes her, that she will never look at her with love and compassion. The mistress then says very harsh: "How dare you affirm that, Jane Eyre?" (Brontë 1994:38) And Jane respond promptly: "How dare I, Mrs Reed? How dare I? Because it is the *truth*." (Brontë 1994:38, Italics by author)

Jane is similar to Alceste, a person that without any inclination to social small talk. When she later in the novel are being asked to entertain a man with conversation, she sits silent and thinks: "If he expects me to talk for the mere sake of talking and showing off, he will find he has addressed himself to the wrong person..." (Brontë 1994:134). But when it concerned the truth, things that had to be said, she could speak, loud and clear. Her passion for the truth and without looking at the consequences, without any sense of picking the socially right moment, created an intolerable situation and she was sent to the boarding school.

But Jane does not regard it as a mistake, as a failure. On the contrary, she appears to experience the Kantian freedom, an elevating, relieving and tonic freedom: "Ere I had finished this reply, my soul began to expand, to exult, with the strangest sense of freedom, of triumph, I ever felt." (Brontë 1994:39). She made the choice of telling the truth, without looking at the consequences, because she had to speak. That's when she for the first time experienced freedom, the freedom that made her speech possible. Consequently, the most rigorous duty, with the most devastating material consequences for the one performing the duty, created the sense of freedom, in accordance with the Kantian concept.

In the novels dramatic climax, Jane approached the altar in order to marry the man of her love, the landlord whose stepdaughter she has trained. But there is a grave impediment, the fact that the landlord is already married, though an unhappy marriage which he was fooled to engage in. But yet it is a marriage. The landlord pleads Jane to disregard the marriage and beg her to be practical. He was fooled into the marriage with the insane woman, that now lives separated from all humans, looked into one of the wings of the castle. Practically speaking, he regards himself as not being married: "Is it better to drive a fellow-creature to despair than to transgress a mere human law, no man being injured by the breach? – for you

have neither relatives nor acquaintances whom you need fear to offend by living with me.” (Brontë 1994:313). The man refer both to the consequences for him, that he would be disconsolate if she follows a simple law, and that break the law would harm no-one, least her since she has no relatives that would put a curse on her. He uses here a reference to altruism, to make an act of belongingness, since there is no break of belongingness through the formal marriage because the marriage woman is insane and he was fooled into the marriage. The adultery can therefore be disregarded in practice. He refers to both his egoism and her egoism, and the altruistic action to live with him, even if he formally is married.

Jane is close to give in and in the novel we get a very dramatic story about the fights in her soul. She tries to overcome the conflict through saying to herself that she can give in, since it is good for him, it is good for love, and, she ask her self: ”Who in the world cares for *you*? or who will be injured by what you do?” (Brontë 1994:314, italics by the author)

Her response is fast and sharp: ”Still indomitable was the reply: *I care for myself.* The more solitary, the more friendless, the more unsustained I am, the more I will respect myself. I will keep the law given by God; sanctioned by man. I will hold the principles received by me when I was sane, and not mad – as I am now. Laws and principles are not for times when there is no temptation; they are for such moments as this, when body and soul rise in mutiny against their rigour; stringent are they; inviolate they shall be. If at my individual convenience I might break them, what would be their worth? They have a worth – so I have always belived; and if I cannot believe it now, it is because I am insane – quite insane, with my veins running fire, and my hearth beating faster than I can count its throbs. Preconceived opinions, foregone determinations are all I have at this hour to stand by; there I plant my foot.” (Brontë 1994:314, italics by author)

This is a lengthy and strong speech for the Kantian duty, to act in accordance to your principles, especially when they are hard to perform, when the costs, even the individual costs are significant, and without letting the emotions and the soul interfere and influence the action. As Jane is saying, the values of principles are revealed when they are hard to obey. She says also in the introduction of the citation that it is certainly about obeying the laws given by God and sanctioned by man, but above that, it is to obey because she demands it, it is her choice. And that she do it for her own sake. She is a solitary being in the world that acts according to the principles she has chosen. Without any consideration of the consequences, individual or social, she perform her duty, she follows and obey her principles. She does it for her own sake, because she cares about herself as a solitary being, as an autonomous subject. It has nothing to do with social respect, gained through social belongingness. It is absolutely not

about satisfying small egoistic inclinations, such as happiness through love. It is about respecting one-self, about self-respect, which the duty creates.

Even if all this indicates a strong sense of duty, there is, however, a small indication that Jane are also acting out of a feeling of egoism. The man she almost got married to have had many mistresses, to silence his sorry, but now he talked disparaging about them. Jane state: "...that if I were so far to forget myself and all the teaching that had ever been instilled into me, as – under any pretext – with any justification – through any temptation – to become the successor of these poor girls, he would one day regard me with the same feeling which now in his mind desecrated their memory." (Brontë 1994:309). If she gives in for her hearth, then she has not only deceived herself and all her principles, but she will also, sooner or later, be deceived by the man, that will despise her since she was not firm in being Jane Eyre. Thus, there is a lot of reference to the duty, but also to the contempt he will have against her in the future if she gives in. So, for her and for him, she is firm in her obedience of her duty, but do also reveal egoistic calculus.

Early one morning Jane Eyre leaves the manor, still fighting against her egoistic and altruistic drives that are trying to get her back to the manor and to him. The continuation of the novel is left for the reader to investigate and experience. We are satisfied with the notion that Jane Eyre has showed the essence of the message by Kant, that if you follow your duties, you experience freedom, since duty is to be free, and you experience self-respect. Certainly, she gives reference to the Bible and human law, but these principles are not selecting her; she selects them, thus it is an act of freedom. She follows no commands, no orders, but her own principles, without looking at the consequences, other than self-respect. Without self-respect she would have been nothing, even if she would have been a wife to the man she loves.

This indicates a complication in the teaching on duty. Is it the case that duty, at the final end, is about self-respect, i.e., it is very individualistic? Despite the fact that the doctrine says that one should act in such a way, that it can be universal law for all creatures of reason, i.e., it is supra-individual, including not all humans, but all creatures with reason, it appears to assume that individuals of duty are seeking self-respect.

One solution to this complication, where the individual appear to be collectivistic, is that reason is one, that reason is not individual but collective. Reason belongs to everyone; the only variance is the person's ability to use the reason. With only one reason, but many different capacities to apply reason, we can infer that reason carried by one human can arrive at a principle that can be made into a universal law. This is one possible solution, based on the idea that Kant created all the a-priori categories, which where categories carried by everyone. It

is quite conceivable that humans have similar moral categories that make it possible to arrive at universal laws.

Adolf Eichmann

Duty is similar with love in the sense that it is blind. Duty is governed by the will to act in accordance to a principle, without regard to consequences. Duty is blind for consequences, since it is not lead by affections, effects or utility, but of the principle. This makes duty vulnerable to criticism that it is indifferent to effects of actions. This was brought to matters of a head at the Nürnberg-trials where defendants claimed that they were only performing their duty.

Eichmann used duty as his defence and claimed in the Jerusalem trail 1960, according to Hannah Arendt (1996) in her famous book 'Eichmann in Jerusalem: A report on the banality of evil', that he lived according to the moral teaching of Kant, especially the categorical imperative. His duty was so strong that he felt uncomfortable when he, due to family reasons, diverted from his duty. He helped a half-Jewish cousin and a Jewish couple because his uncle has asked him. He appeared to be more inflicted that they escaped the Holocaust due to his break of duty instead of the millions that were killed. Thus, the voice of conscience is strong for those acting in accordance to duty.

Eichmann claimed that Kant stopped being a guide when he got the order of Holocaust. His argument was that Holocaust was not in accordance to his will, but that he had to obey the order. Thus, he accepted to become a mean, and not using his reason, which are a breach of the two requisites for Kantian moral duty.

This way of acting, to obey what they call duty, was used by the Nazi in the Nürnberg-trials. That is, however, to seek justification in an old myth. Abraham took his son and put him on the sacrificial altar and raised his knife in order to obey the demand of his god, Jahve, to kill his son. He accepted to become a simple mean, and he did not use his reason in order to find out if this was an acceptable act. He just obeyed. The moral content, the moral responsibility would therefore be transported from Abraham, the tool, to Jahve, the actor. Abraham and the Nazi were but simple tools for Jahve and Der Führer.

Submission is, however, not duty. As Hanna correctly remarks, duty is based on practical reason, not on someone else's will. The Kantian categorical imperative would ask you if you could accept as a universal principle that humans should abandon their reason, their autonomy and to surrender to someone else's will. The answer is that this is to abdicate from your freedom, which is a basic assumption of humans. Thus, you cannot escape your freedom,

as the existentialist is learning us, since that escape is but a manifestation of your freedom. This becomes a contradiction, and therefore cannot be made a universal principle.

Duty is based on practical reason, not on the laws of the state or on any will of any God or a Führer. As we noted earlier, duty can not even be based on the actors wish to become happy, i.e., egoism, or to belong to a group, i.e., belongingness. Duty can only be based on the wish to act according to a principle that can be made a general principle. That principle can never encompass the will to abdicate as a free human since it is only a free human that can act out of duty. Thus, Abraham is morally guilty of attempt to murder and Eichmann is guilty of assistance to murder.

Obedience towards a God or a Führer is in the Kantian moral replaced with Reason, which everyone is carrying, and have a responsibility to use. The revolutionary in his doctrine is that he makes these mystic Beings unemployed.

If this is correct, the consequences are dramatic since it implies that if I can show that a law is not in accordance to reason, then I have no obligation or duty to follow that law, since it cannot be made a general principle. Thus, it is an invitation to social insubordination. But it is also an invitation to free speech, making it possible to present all versions of principles that compete for being general principles.

The example with Eichmann shows that duty cannot be used as an excuse for obedience. Duty is not blind submission; on the contrary, it is manifestation of freedom and Reason. Duty could, to be sure, be experienced as a burden since it implies action without any calculus of individual happiness. But duty is an expression of the freedom of the individual since it is chosen by the individual. Duty is imperative for the action, but not for the individual, since it is the individual that has made the choice of the maxim, i.e., the principle.

One should therefore be attentative when someone claims to be acting out of duty. To be certain, it is an act of compulsion in the concrete situation since the individual have to perform the act and have to disregard the consequences. But at the same time, the individual have to be proud, as indeed Jane Eyre were, since the act is an expression of the freedom of the individual that proudly can perform in accordance to a freely selected principle. Thus, duty can never be used as an excuse, as an expression of coercion, and thereby declare the individual as being without responsibility. Nothing can be more wrong. Duty is a manifestation of a free individual that are using her practical Reason.

TO STUDY DUTY EMPIRICALLY

Duty is originating from a sense of principles, but does also include cognition. An individual have to be able to understand that the situation at hand have to be approached through an act of duty. Thus, we need a concept including both cognition and action. One such concept is Weltanschauung, that contains ontology (what is), explanation (where does it come from), prediction (where are we going), axiology (good and bad), praxiology (how to act) and epistemology (what is true) [as developed by Apostel (Vidal, 2007)]. A Weltanschauung creates an understanding of reality, categorise the situation at hand and makes it possible to act according to one of the three instincts and to value the action.

The conception of Weltanschauung has been used in order to understand commonalities between people, sometimes aggregated into ideas of people, or Volk. Our initial conception of Weltanschauung is different, since we propose it as a concept to understand the individual in the business world. Following the Kantian conception of duty, it is a concept that is related to reason, which in Kantian philosophy is an objective concept, but in our conception will be an individual concept, tied to the individual, explaining the act of the individual. Of course, one can have rather well founded expectations that there are many elements of a Weltanschauung that are common within a group of individuals. These commonalities could even be the very glue that keeps them together in a group. But when we enter the idea of a glue keeping individuals together, we are entering the logic of belongingness. In order to keep the logics separate, we therefore need to make Weltanschauung an individual concept. Additionally, following the conception by Kant, a duty is performed by an autonomous and free individual, thus duty is decided independently by the individual, not by obedience or influence by anyone.

The use of Weltanschauung as a concept is mainly motivated by methodological reasons. We need a conception including both cognitive categories and practical categories when analyzing behaviour. Since we are looking for actions that are motivated by principles, we need to find out basic ideas of the actor, even those that are not known by the respondent.

The objects of an empirical study would preferable be managers, since we have found earlier that they probably are behaving according to duty more frequently. Managers are, however, presumably very strong in legitimating their opinions and actions. This put a special demand on the empirical study since we have to discern actions and reasoning connected with duty. Since duty is not a frequent legitimate reason for action, an act of duty could be assumed to be presented as an act of selfishness or belongingness. To be able to observe the different rationalities and develop an instrument of describing an individual's Weltanschauung, the

technique of in-dept interview has probably to be performed in order to reach beyond the political legitimating practice of the manager and tendencies to confabulate (Horgan and Timmons, 2007).

A second reason could be put forward for the use of *Weltanschauung*. With increasing hierarchical level, managers are presumably living in a world of increasing number of information and impressions. This variety of information and impression would create an experience of complexity, i.e., many factors that are interrelated with each other and with mixing causalities, making it hard to predict outcomes. With increasing hierarchical level, there will be an increasing demand and wish to have a model that can reduce the complexity into a comprehensive model where only a few factors and their relationships are sorted out. *Weltanschauung* is such a model that can offer order and create an image of understanding. Thus, we believe that a *Weltanschauung* is more needed and therefore more established and manifest at managerial levels.

This reasoning induces the controversial hypotheses that acts of duty are more frequent with increasing hierarchical level, and more frequent when the manager experience complex situations. Additionally, it is conceivable that duty can be more or less frequent as motivation of human action in certain environments. These propositions and the hypothesis can be tested using the technique of data collection through surveys. While realising the difficulties of operationalising both *Weltanschauung* and acts of duty into simple statements demanded by the survey technique, the opportunity to be able to test the conception of duty can be exploited. An empirical study has to select managers on different hierarchical levels and in different environments, thus selecting managers from the private, the public and the voluntary sector.

A survey has the opportunity to utilise a conception originally created in development psychology. The categorization into selfishness, belongingness and duty appears to follow a notion of human development in psychology, based on Piaget's theory. Kohlberg (1973) divided human moral development into three stages: 1.) Preconventional level, where the human is governed by physical or hedonistic consequences of action, i.e., representing the instinct of selfishness; 2.) Conventional level, where the human is governed by expectations from the group, be it the family, working place or even the nation, i.e., representing the instinct of belongingness; 3.) Postconventional level, or Autonomous level, where the human define principles that is separate from the groups and from the consequences for the individual, i.e., the instinct of duty. This conception have been used in empirical studies (Kohlberg, 1981; Candee and Kohlberg, 1987)), thus being proven capable of observing moral reasoning. It is also in line with game theory experiments when playing the ultimatum game, where

kindergartners behaved more in accordance to the instinct of selfishness, and older children had reached the conventional level, acting according to fairness (Camerer & Thaler, 1995). Kohlberg, based solely on Kantian moral theory, can be classified as belonging to cognitive rationalism (Shweder and Haidt, 1993), where morality can be ordered in different stages, disregarding the Hume'ian notion of emotions, and being opposed to eudaimonism, where morality belongs to the development of the self (Campbell and Christopher, 1996). Our position of instincts does not need to make assumptions of stages, but only of different instincts. Thus, emotions could be a drive to act in accordance to one of the three instincts. Yet, adhering to the origin from Kant, duty is correlated with *Weltanschauung*, thus belonging to Reason and not to emotions.

SOME IMPLICATIONS OF DUTY

The instinct of duty will create situations that are similar to those created by opportunistic acts. It will therefore create what can be considered as agency costs. But while opportunism in ordinary sense is action out of self-interest, where the interest of the principal is colliding with the interest of the agent, this is not really the case when acts are performed due to duty. The agent performing an act of duty is not seeking some value, she is not maximizing a preference function, but are acting out of a maxim. Thus, it could be said to be a possible collision, not of interest, but of principles, as in the opening example. Additionally, in the case of opportunism, there is always the possibility to influence the agent and her calculus, creating incentives which will reduce the goal incongruence. These are the part of agency costs that are alignment costs. It is hard to conceive these costs in the case of an act out of duty. Maybe the only opportunity is to try to redirect the action through referring to the *Weltanschauung* of the individual and transfer it into the other two instincts that can be managed through sanctions or incentives. Thus, opportunism as an act is present in the model of duty, but it is not a conflict of interest, but of principles, and no possibilities of alignment appear to be present, except by referring to the cognitive part of the *Weltanschauung* and by that transfer the situation to appeal to the two other instincts. .

The instinct of duty could at first glance be hard to predict, appearing as an outburst of strong principle action. But through our empirical examples of *Alceste*, *Jane Eyre* and *Eichmann*, we realize that if the *Weltanschauung* of the person could be known, it is not hard to predict the action. Thus, duty has the possibility to create certainty, which is a much appreciated property in the world of business.

We believe that acts of duty cannot be influenced through incentives or sanctions. If having the need of governing the manager, the strongest mechanism of use in order to govern acts of duty would be selection of managers. The human resource function would then be occupied with investigating the *Weltanschauung* of individuals that could be selected for managerial promotion.

SUMMARY

Duty is a human faculty to act in accordance to what is considered as being right. The situation is interpreted and the action is evaluated using a *Weltanschauung*, which contains cognitive elements, i.e., ontological and epistemological elements, and praxis elements. These elements make it possible for the actor to understand the situation and to reach a conclusion about a proper action. The proper action is implementing a maxim, which has been evaluated using the categorical imperative. Through duty the individual manifest itself as a free, autonomous and intelligible being with self-respect.

Duty evolved to more dominance when violence was monopolized and humans had to interact with an increasing number of other humans. Thus, one hypothesis of duty is that we expect duty to be more frequent in stable, non-violent societies.

We have offered three explanations of duty: 1.) To be a mechanical transfer of nepotism into altruism; 2.) To be a result of leadership selection where humans with more tendency of duty are selected since they are more predictable, less egoistic, working more for the group or universal principles; 3.) To be an effect of humans capacity of social construction, where duty do not cause survival, but is an effect of the freedom of humans that cause survival.

Extreme behaviour of duty, as in the case of *Alceste*, demands intermediaries that mediate between the acting actor of duty and the reacting actors.

Concrete action is, as indeed even the persons of our novels indicate, especially *Jane Eyre*, acting in accordance to all three instincts. When actors are performing solely according to one instinct, they become laughing-stocks.

Acting due to duty has the similarities of the other instincts, to be revolutionary, independent of democracy or dictatorship. When the economic man are asking: what are the gains of not obeying the law?, the social man is asking: Will I gain in status if obeying the law?, and the moral man is asking: Could the law be made a universal principle?

Acts of duty will create collision of principles, thus creating demand of governance. The governance possible is to direct the situation in accordance to the individuals *Weltanschauung* or to select individuals that are carriers of the *Weltanschauung* that is in

accordance to the interest of the principal. Thus, we can hypothesize that persuasion and selection are important governance mechanisms.

We believe that duty is more emphasized on higher hierarchical level, not only due to selection, as our earlier hypothesis indicated, but also because elements of duty makes it possible to act, even when experiencing the extensive flow of information and impressions, and uncertainty characterizing higher hierarchical levels.

Empirically, duty could be studied using categories of human development that has been constructed in psychology. It has to be noted, however, that due to the dominating ideology of especially the instinct of selfishness, empirical studies have to be strong in critique and in looking behind facades. Since we have hypothesised that duty will be more frequent in uncertain environments, but characterised by social stability, especially non-violence, we would select contrasting situations of, for example, humans in stable industries, such as steel, and in unstable industries, such as IT, and in environments of less stability, such as transitional societies, especially those with a weak state, and environments with very high levels of stability with low levels of non-state violence, such as the Scandinavian countries.

Concluding the paper, we believe that we have made duty a reasonable category of human action, if not an instinct of humans, using evolutionary arguments in order to support our thesis. We have indicated opportunities of empirically studying duty through offering testable hypotheses and suggestions of empirical design. Thus, we claim that management science can include Kant and action due to duty in the arsenal of explanations. But, in order to avoid comedies such as the one produced by Moliere's *Alceste*, we have to avoid hegemony of any human instinct. Avoidance of the comedy of one-sidedness offers, however, a theoretical challenge, that of creating a meta-theory of instincts, resembling meta-ranking ("...rankings of preference rankings..."[p.337]) as proposed by Sen (1977), where we are able to predict a human's propensity to use one of the three instincts. In our introductory example, Hans made the choice to adhere to duty, not to belongingness or selfishness. We are still in a need of explaining Hans' choice of acting in accordance to his duty instead of promoting his wallet or his status. Maybe we have to look for the will of instincts in the Hume'ian emotional will, Schopenhauer's interest of the will or in our tendency to use heuristics (Sunstein, 2005) or to act morphologically rational (Horgan and Timmons, 2007). These are, however, questions for future research to deal with.

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